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We	show	that	malicious	COVID-19	content,	including	hate	speech,	disinformation,	and	
misinformation,	exploits	the	multiverse	of	online	hate	to	spread	quickly	beyond	the	control	of	
any	individual	social	media	platform.	Machine	learning	topic	analysis	shows	quantitatively	how	
online	hate	communities	are	weaponizing	COVID-19,	with	topics	evolving	rapidly	and	content	
becoming	increasingly	coherent.	Our	mathematical	analysis	provides	a	generalized	form	of	the	
public	health	R0	predicting	the	tipping	point	for	multiverse-wide	viral	spreading,	which	
suggests	new	policy	options	to	mitigate	the	global	spread	of	malicious	COVID-19	content	
without	relying	on	future	coordination	between	all	online	platforms.		Controlling	the	spread	of	COVID-19	misinformation	and	its	weaponization	against	certain	demographics	(e.g.	anti-Asian)	--	in	particular,	by	the	online	hate	community	of	neo-Nazis	and	other	extremists	--	is	now	an	urgent	problem	[1-6].	In	addition	to	undermining	public	health	policies,	malicious	COVID-19	narratives	are	already	translating	into	offline	violence	[2,3].	Making	matters	worse,	each	social	media	platform	is	effectively	its	own	universe,	i.e.	a	commercially	independent	entity	subject	to	particular	legal	jurisdictions,	and	hence	can	at	best	only	control	content	in	its	universe	[1,4].	Moreover,	there	is	now	a	proliferation	of	other,	far	less	moderated	platforms	thanks	to	open-source	software	enabling	decentralized	setups	across	locations.		Winning	the	war	against	such	malicious	matter	will	require	an	understanding	of	the	entire	online	battlefield	and	new	policing	approaches	that	do	not	rely	on	global	collaboration	between	social	media	platforms.	Here	we	offer	such	a	combined	solution.	Specifically,	Figs.	1	and	2	show	how	COVID-19	malicious	content	is	exploiting	the	existing	online	hate	network	to	spread	quickly	between	platforms	and	hence	beyond	the	control	of	any	single	platform	(Fig.	1A,B).	Methods	and	Supplementary	Information	(SI)	give	details	and	examples	of	this	material.	Links	between	distinct	platforms	(i.e.	universes)	act	like	wormholes	to	create	a	huge,	decentralized	multiverse	that	connects	hate	communities	(nodes	with	black	circles,	Fig.	1B)	to	the	mainstream	(nodes	without	black	circles,	Fig.	1B).	Figure	1B	involves	~10,000,000	users	across	languages	and	continents	who	have	formed	themselves	into	~6,000	inter-linked	public	clusters,	i.e.	online	communities	such	as	a	Facebook	page,	VKontakte	group,	or	Telegram	channel,	each	represented	as	a	node	in	Figs.	1,2.	These	new	insights	inform	the	policy	prescriptions	offered	in	Fig.	3.			Our	methodology	[7,	8]	focuses	on	the	mesoscopic	scale	of	online	clusters	(i.e.	node	in	Fig.	1)	where	each	cluster	is	an	interest-based	online	community	(e.g.	VKontakte	group).	It	is	known	that	such	clusters	are	where	people	develop,	and	coordinate	around,	narratives	[9]	--	in	contrast	to	platforms	like	Twitter	that	have	no	pre-built	community	tool	and	are	instead	designed	for	broadcasting	short	messages	[7-9].	Each	link	is	an	online	hyperlink	that	appears	at	the	level	of	the	entire	cluster	(e.g.	Fig.	2A).	Including	links	between	clusters	across	different	platforms	(see	Methods	and	SI)	then	enables	us	to	map	the	broader,	global	online	ecology	at	the	entire	system	level.	
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Figure	1:	Spreading	across	Online	Hate	Multiverse.	A:	Time	evolution	of	birth	and	spread	of	malicious	COVID-19	
content	within	and	across	different	social	media	platforms	(i.e.	universes)	for	small	section	from	B.		
B:	Online	hate	multiverse	comprises	separate	social	media	platforms	(i.e.	universes)	that	interconnect	over	time	via	
dynamical	links	(i.e.	wormholes)	created	by	hyperlinks	from	clusters	on	one	platform	into	clusters	on	another	(e.g.	
Fig.	2A).	Links	shown	are	from	hate	clusters	(i.e.	online	communities	with	hateful	content,	shown	as	a	node	with	a	
black	ring)	to	all	other	clusters	including	mainstream	ones	(e.g.	football	fan	club)	which	it	can	then	influence.	Link	
color	denotes	the	platform	hosting	the	hate	cluster	from	which	link	originates.	Plot	aggregates	activity	from	June	1st	
2019	to	March	23rd,	2020.	The	observed	layout	is	spontaneous	(i.e.	not	built-in,	see	Methods).	Small	black	square	is	
a	Gab	cluster	analyzed	in	Fig.	2B.	C:	Model	features	dynamical	links	connecting	and	disconnecting	clusters	of	clusters	
(i.e.	coalescence	with	probability	𝜈!"#$,	fragmentation	with	probability	𝜈%&#').	D:	Phase	diagram	shows	
generalization	of	public	health	R0	that	predicts	tipping	point	for	online	spreading.	E:	Output	from	model	in	C,D	
compared	to	empirical	data	from	A	(see	Methods	and	SI	for	details).			
Working	paper:	to	be	updated	
 
3 
 
	
Figure	2:	Multiverse	Pathways	and	Content.	A:	Example	pathway	for	a	piece	of	malicious	matter.	B:	Example	output	
from	our	machine	learning	topic	analysis	of	content	[10]	within	a	single	example	Gab	cluster	(see	small	black	circle	
in	Fig.	1B).	Even	though	COVID-19	topic	only	arose	in	December	2019,	it	quickly	evolved	from	featuring	a	large	
number	of	topics	with	a	relatively	low	average	coherence	score,	a	measure	of	semantic	similarity,	to	a	smaller	
number	of	topics	with	higher	average	coherence	scores	more	focused	around	COVID-19.	Reflecting	this,	we	note	that	
prior	to	COVID-19,	topics	featured	words	like	f***	and	n*****,	while	the	conversation	around	COVID-19	is	more	
focused	and	less	like	a	stereotypical	hate-speech	rant.	SI	shows	explicit	examples	of	this	content.	
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The	first	general	implication	of	our	findings	is	that	policies	to	curb	COVID-19	and	related	malicious	matter	need	to	account	for	the	decentralized,	interconnected	nature	of	this	multiverse	(Fig.	1).	Links	connecting	nodes	from	different	universes	(i.e.,	different	social	media	platforms)	provide	a	gateway	that	can	pass	malicious	content	(and	supporters)	from	a	cluster	on	one	platform	to	a	cluster	on	another	platform	that	may	be	very	distant	geographically,	linguistically,	and	culturally,	e.g.	from	Facebook	to	VKontakte.	Figure	2A	shows	that	consecutive	use	of	these	links	allows	malicious	matter	to	find	short	pathways	that	cross	the	entire	multiverse,	just	as	short	planks	of	wood	can	be	used	to	bridge	adjacent	rocks	and	cross	a	wide	river.	Moreover	since	malicious	matter	frequently	carries	quotes	and	imagery	from	different	moments	in	a	cluster’s	timeline,	these	inter-platform	links	not	only	interconnect	information	from	disparate	points	in	space,	but	also	time	--	like	a	wormhole.		A	second	implication	comes	from	our	machine-learning	topic	analysis	using	Latent	Dirichlet	Allocation	to	identify	topics	discussed	in	the	online	hate	multiverse,	and	then	calculating	a	coherence	score	for	different	topics	[10]	(see	Fig.	2B	and	SI).	This	shows	that	clusters	in	the	global	online	hate	community	are	coalescing	around	COVID-19,	with	topic	flavors	evolving	rapidly	and	their	coherence	scores	increasing.	Examples	of	weaponized	content	(see	SI)	reveal	evolving	narratives	such	as	blaming	Jews	and	immigrants	for	inventing	and	spreading	the	virus,	and	instances	of	neo-Nazis	planning	attacks	on	emergency	responders	to	the	health	crisis.	While	these	topics	have	evolved	over	,	the	underlying	structure	in	Fig.	1B	remains	rather	robust	which	suggests	that	our	implications	should	also	hold	in	the	future.	
 A	third	implication	is	that	malicious	activity	can	appear	isolated	and	largely	eradicated	on	a	given	platform,	when	in	reality	it	has	moved	through	a	wormhole	to	another	universe.	There,	malicious	content	can	thrive	beyond	that	platform’s	control,	be	further	honed,	and	later	reintroduced	into	the	original	platform	using	a	wormhole	in	the	reverse	direction.	Moderators	reviewing	only	blue	clusters	in	Fig.	1B	might	conclude	that	they	had	largely	rid	that	platform	of	hate	and	disconnected	hateful	pages	from	one	another,	when	in	fact	these	same	clusters	remain	connected	via	other	universes.	Because	the	number	of	independent	online	universes	(i.e.	social	media	platforms)	is	growing,	this	multiverse	will	continue	to	grow	and	will	likely	be	deeply	interconnected	via	new	wormhole	links.	 	Implication	4	is	that	this	multiverse	acts	like	a	global	funnel	that	can	suck	individuals	from	a	mainstream	cluster	on	a	platform	that	invests	significant	resources	in	moderation,	into	less	moderated	platforms	like	4Chan	or	Telegram,	simply	by	following	the	links	offered	to	them.	Critically,	an	innocent	user	of	mainstream	social	media	communities,	including	a	child	connecting	with	other	online	game	players	or	a	parent	seeking	information	about	COVID-19,	is	at	most	a	few	links	away	from	intensely	hateful	content.	In	this	way,	the	rise	of	fear	and	misinformation	around	COVID-19	has	allowed	promoters	of	malicious	matter	and	hate	to	engage	with	mainstream	audiences	around	a	common	topic	of	interest,	and	potentially	push	them	toward	hateful	views. 	Implication	5	is	that	it	is	highly	unlikely	that	the	multiverse	in	Fig.	1B	is,	or	could	be,	coordinated	by	a	single	state	actor,	given	its	vast	decentralized	nature.	We	have	checked	for	signals	of	Russian-sponsored	campaigns.	Since	many	hate	clusters	organize	around	the	topics	of	minorities	and	refugees,	we	expected	to	find	frequent	links	to	Russian	media,	but	instead	only	found	a	small	portion	of	clusters	linking	to	Kremlin-affiliated	domains.	These	links	accounted	for	<0.5%	of	all	posts	shared.	This	is	also	consistent	with	the	notion	that	the	extended	nature	of	exchanges	in	a	cluster	(i.e.	online	community)	enables	it	to	collectively	weed	out	unwanted	trolls	and	bot-like	members.		
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Figure	3:	Wormhole	Engineering	to	Mitigate	Malicious	Content	Spreading.	A-B:	Typical	motifs	within	the	full	
multiverse	in	Fig.	1B.		
C:	Mathematical	prediction	for	motif	A,	showing	that	the	distribution	of	shortest	paths	(top	panel,	shown	
unnormalized)	for	transporting	malicious	matter	across	a	platform	(i.e.	universe	1)	can	be	shifted	to	larger	values	
(bottom	panel)	which	will	then	delay	spreading	and	will	increase	the	chance	that	the	malicious	matter	is	detected	
and	removed	[11,12].	This	is	achieved	by	manipulating	the	risk	that	the	hate	material	gets	detected	when	passing	via	
the	other	platform:	this	risk	represents	a	cost	for	the	hate	community	in	universe	1	when	using	the	blue	node(s).	
Same	mathematics	applies	irrespective	of	whether	each	blue	node	is	a	single	cluster	or	an	entire	platform,	and	
applies	when	both	blue	clusters	are	in	the	same	platform	or	are	in	different	platforms.	See	SI	for	case	B.		
D-F:	Mathematical	prediction	that	the	total	online	support	for	malicious	matter	can	be	manipulated	by	varying	the	
online	pool	size	of	potential	supporters	N(t)	and/or	their	heterogeneity	F(t).	E:	Empirical	outbreak	of	anti-U.S.	hate	
across	a	single	platform	(VKontakte)	produces	similar	shape	to	upper	curve	in	D.	F:	Empirical	outbreak	for	the	proxy	
system	of	predatory	‘buy’	algorithms	across	multiple	electronic	platforms	[13]	produces	similar	shape	to	lower	
curve	in	D.	(See	SI	for	details).		
		Implication	6	addresses	the	key	issue	that	coordinated	moderation	between	all	platforms	--	while	highly	desirable	--	may	not	be	possible.	To	bypass	this,	our	mathematical	predictions	suggest	that	bilateral	wormhole	engineering	could	be	used	by	platforms	to	artificially	lengthen	the	pathways	that	
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malicious	matter	needs	to	take	between	clusters,	hence	increasing	the	chances	of	its	detection	by	regulators	and	also	delaying	the	spread	of	time-sensitive	material	such	as	hate	manifestos	and	real-time	streaming	of	attacks	(see	SI	for	details).	This	involves	the	following	repeated	process:	first,	pairs	of	platforms	use	Fig.	1B	to	estimate	the	likely	numbers	of	wormholes	between	them.	Then	without	having	to	exchange	any	sensitive	data,	each	can	then	use	our	mathematical	formulae	(see	SI)	to	engineer	the	correct	cost	w	for	hate-spreaders	who	are	exploiting	their	platform	as	a	pathway,	e.g.	they	focus	available	moderator	time	to	achieve	a	particular	detection	rate	for	hate	material	passing	through	their	platform	and	hence	create	an	effective	cost	w	for	these	hate-spreaders	in	terms	of	detection	and	removal.	While	Figs.	3A,B	show	common	situations	that	arise	in	Fig.	1B,	more	complex	combinations	can	be	described	using	similar	calculations	(see	SI)	in	order	to	predict	how	the	path	lengths	for	hate	material	can	be	artificially	extended	in	a	similar	way	to	Fig.	3C. 	With	or	without	such	wormhole	engineering,	the	dynamics	of	how	malicious	matter	passes	across	the	multiverse	in	Fig.	1B	is	highly	complex	since	there	are	wormholes	(and	hence	pathways)	opening	and	closing	(or	getting	restricted)	in	real	time,	and	hence	subsets	of	clusters	effectively	coalescing	or	fragmenting	as	in	Fig.	1C.	Despite	this	complexity,	we	can	provide	the	condition	that	needs	to	be	met	to	
prevent	multiverse-wide	spreading	of	a	particular	piece	of	malicious	matter	(see	SI	for	derivation	[14]).	This	no-spreading	condition	is	R0= (𝜈!"#$	𝑝)/(𝜈&'#(	𝑞)	<	1	where	𝜈!"#$ 	(𝜈&'#()	is	the	average	rate	at	which	subsets	of	clusters	coalesce	(fragment)	within	and	across	platforms;	𝑝	is	the	average	rate	at	which	a	single	cluster	shares	material	with	another	cluster;	𝑞	is	the	average	rate	at	which	a	single	cluster	becomes	inactive.	These	parameters	can	be	estimated	empirically	or	from	simulations.	Conversely	the	condition	for	system-wide	spreading,	which	can	be	used	to	guide	dissemination	of	counter-messaging,	is	R0>	1.	While	𝑝	and	𝑞	are	properties	related	to	a	single	average	cluster	and	likely	harder	to	manipulate,	platform	engineers	can	use	the	tools	at	their	disposal	to	try	to	change	𝜈!"#$ 	and	𝜈&'#(	and	hence	engineer	the	value	of		R0.	If	no	such	wormhole	engineering	can	be	arranged,	our	predictions	(see	SI)	show	that	an	alternative	though	far	more	challenging	way	of	reducing	the	spread	of	hate	material	is	by	manipulating	either	(1)	the	size	N	of	its	online	potential	supporters	(e.g.	by	placing	a	cap	on	the	size	of	clusters)	and/or	(2)	their	heterogeneity	F	(e.g.	by	introducing	other	content	that	effectively	dilutes	a	cluster’s	focus).	Figure	3D	shows	examples	of	the	resulting	time-evolution	of	the	online	support,	given	by	𝑁 '1−𝑊 '*)2*+, + 𝑒𝑥𝑝 *)2*+, +. / *)2*+, +.	where	the	resulting	delayed	onset	time	for	the	rise	in	support	is	𝑡"-./+ = ,2*	and	where	𝑊	is	the	Lambert	function	[15].	Figures	3E	and	F	show	related	empirical	findings	which	are	remarkably	similar	to	Fig.	3D.	Figure	3F	is	a	proxy	system	[13]	in	which	ultrafast	predatory	algorithms	began	operating	across	electronic	platforms	to	attack	a	financial	market	order	book	in	subsecond	time	(see	Ref.	13).	Hence	Fig.	3F	also	serves	to	show	what	might	happen	in	the	future	if	the	hate	multiverse	in	Fig.	1B	were	to	become	populated	by	such	predatory	algorithms	whose	purpose	is	now	to	quickly	spread	malicious	matter.	Worryingly,	Fig.	3F	shows	that	this	could	result	in	a	multiverse-wide	rise	in	malicious	matter	on	an	ultrafast	timescale	that	lies	beyond	human	reaction	times	[13].			This	analysis	of	course	requires	follow-up	work.	Our	mathematical	formulae	are,	like	any	model,	imperfect	approximations.	However,	we	have	checked	that	they	agree	with	large-scale	numerical	simulations	[11-15]	and	follow	similar	thinking	to	other	key	models	in	the	literature	[16-18].	Going	forward,	other	forms	of	malicious	matter	and	messaging	platforms	need	to	be	included.	However,	our	initial	analysis	suggests	similar	findings	for	any	platforms	that	allow	communities	(i.e.,	clusters)	to	form.	We	should	also	further	our	analysis	of	the	time-evolution	of	cluster	content	using	the	machine-learning	Local	Dirichlet	Allocation	approach	and	other	methods.	We	could	also	define	links	differently,	e.g.	numbers	of	members	that	clusters	have	in	common.	However,	such	information	is	not	publicly	available	for	some	platforms,	e.g.	Facebook.	Moreover,	our	prior	study	of	a	Facebook-like	platform	where	such	information	was	available,	showed	low/high	numbers	of	common	members	reflects	the	
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absence/existence	of	a	cluster-level	link,	hence	these	quantities	indeed	behave	similarly	to	each	other.	People	can	be	members	of	multiple	clusters.	However	our	prior	analyses	suggest	only	a	small	percentage	are	active	members	of	multiple	clusters.	In	terms	of	how	people	react	to	intervention,	it	is	known	that	some	may	avoid	opposing	views	[19]	while	for	others	it	may	harden	beliefs	[20].	However,	what	will	actually	happen	in	practice	remains	an	empirical	question.		
	
	
	
	
Methods	Our	methodology	for	identifying	clusters	and	links	builds	on	Refs.	7,	8	and	includes	links	between	clusters	across	multiple	platforms.	More	details	are	provided	in	the	SI.	The	clusters	are	interest-based	online	communities	(e.g.,	VKontakte	group).	We	include	mainstream	platforms	like	Facebook,	VKontakte,	and	Instagram,	that	have	and	enforce	policies	against	hate	speech,	as	well	as	fringe	platforms	with	minimal	content	policies	like	Gab,	Telegram,	and	4Chan.	While	the	method	can	be	replicated	for	any	topic,	Fig.	1B	focuses	on	hate	and	hate-speech	defined	as	either	(a)	content	that	would	fall	under	the	provisions	of	the	United	States’	Code	regarding	hate	crimes	or	hate	speech	according	to	Department	of	Justice’s	guidelines,	or	(b)	content	that	supports	or	promotes	Fascist	ideologies	or	regime	types	(i.e.	extreme	nationalism	and/or	racial	identitarianism).	On-line	communities	promoting	hate	have	become	prevalent	globally	and	are	being	linked	to	many	recent	violent	real-world	attacks,	including	the	2019	Christchurch	shootings.	We	observe	many	different	forms	of	hate	adopting	similar	cross-platform	tricks.	Our	method	focuses	on	clusters	at	the	mesoscale	and	posts	at	the	microscale,	thus	the	only	data	from	individuals	it	captures	is	the	content	of	their	posts,	just	as	information	about	a	specific	molecule	of	water	is	not	needed	to	describe	the	bubbles	(i.e.,	clusters	of	correlated	molecules)	that	form	in	boiling	water.	We	define	a	cluster	(e.g.	Facebook	fan	page,	VKontakte	club)	as	a	hate	cluster	if	at	least	2	out	of	20	of	its	most	recent	posts	at	the	time	of	classification	align	with	the	above	definition	of	hate.	Whether	a	particular	cluster	is	strictly	a	hate	philosophy,	or	simply	shows	material	with	tendencies	toward	hate,	does	not	alter	our	main	findings.	Links	between	clusters	are	hyperlinks	(see	for	example,	Fig.	2A).	Our	network	analysis	for	Fig.	1B	starts	from	a	given	hate	cluster	A	and	captures	any	cluster	B	to	which	hate	cluster	A	has	shared	an	explicit	cluster-level	link.	We	developed	software	to	perform	this	process	automatically	and,	upon	cross-checking	the	findings	with	our	manual	list,	were	able	to	obtain	approximately	90	percent	consistency	between	manual	and	automated	versions.	Figure	2A	shows	an	example	of	clusters	and	wormholes	between	them,	from	our	analysis.	Figure	1E	shows	typical	output	from	our	model	(Fig.	1C,D)	with	𝜈!"#$ = 0.95,	𝜈&'#(=0.05,	𝑝 = 0.05	for	all	four	panels.	For	4Chan	and	Telegram	𝑞 = 0.01;	for	Gab	and	Facebook	𝑞 = 0.005.	All	four	fits	use	these	same	two	model	outputs	suitably	scaled.	Output	is	smoothed	over	timepoints	like	the	empirical	data	which	is	collected	daily.	Better	fits	can	be	obtained	by	optimizing	parameter	choice	but	our	purpose	here	is	just	to	show	that	typical	output	from	our	model	captures	the	observed	features	of	the	empirical	spreading.	All	but	one	node	in	Fig.	1B	is	plotted	using	the	ForceAtlas2	algorithm,	which	simulates	a	physical	system	where	nodes	(clusters)	repel	each	other	while	links	act	as	springs,	and	nodes	that	are	connected	through	a	link	attract	each	other.	Hence	nodes	(clusters)	closer	to	each	other	have	more	highly	interconnected	local	environments	while	those	farther	apart	do	not.	The	exception	to	this	Force	Atlas2	layout	in	Fig.	1B	is	Gab	group	407*	(“Chinese	Coronavirus”,	https://gab.com/groups/407*),	see	small	black	square	in	Fig.	1B)	which	was	manually	placed	in	a	less	crowded	area	to	facilitate	its	visibility.	This	particular	cluster	was	created	in	early	2020	with	a	focus	on	discussing	the	COVID19	pandemic	--	however,	it	immediately	mixed	hate	with	fake	news	and	science,	as	well	as	conspiratorial	content.	
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